Stop re-asking for plugin permissions granted in an earlier session

src/slic3r/plugin/PluginAuditManager.cpp

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <boost/log/trivial.hpp>
 
 #include <algorithm>
+#include <cassert>
 #include <cctype>
 #include <cstddef>
 #include <cstdlib>
@@ -130,6 +131,20 @@ static AuditEventCategory event_category(const std::string& event_name)
     return it == audit_event_categories.end() ? AuditEventCategory::None : it->second;
 }
 
+// Events the 3.12 stdlib raises with sys.audit() inside the function that performs the whole
+// operation, so the raising frame bounds everything the operation does. Every other mapped event
+// is a primitive raised from C, whose current frame is whatever Python code called it -- possibly
+// a library loop over many targets -- so it never marks an operation. glob.glob and glob.glob/2
+// are raised in iglob(), which returns its lazy generator before any directory is listed.
+static const std::unordered_set<std::string> operation_root_events{
+    "urllib.Request",      "http.client.connect",   "os.walk",          "os.fwalk",
+    "glob.glob",           "glob.glob/2",           "pathlib.Path.glob", "pathlib.Path.rglob",
+    "subprocess.Popen",    "pty.spawn",             "tempfile.mkstemp", "tempfile.mkdtemp",
+    "shutil.copyfile",     "shutil.copymode",       "shutil.copystat",  "shutil.copytree",
+    "shutil.chown",        "shutil.move",           "shutil.rmtree",    "shutil.make_archive",
+    "shutil.unpack_archive",
+};
+
 // True for the categories whose targets are filesystem paths, as opposed to a network
 // address or a process command line -- the deny-path and allowed-root checks only make sense
 // against a path.
@@ -146,6 +161,24 @@ static bool is_fs_category(AuditEventCategory category)
     }
 }
 
+// The category's name in a saved event grant, e.g. "FsRead" in "FsRead:open".
+static const char* category_name(AuditEventCategory category)
+{
+    switch (category) {
+    case AuditEventCategory::FsRead:         return "FsRead";
+    case AuditEventCategory::FsReadWrite:    return "FsReadWrite";
+    case AuditEventCategory::FsCreate:       return "FsCreate";
+    case AuditEventCategory::FsDelete:       return "FsDelete";
+    case AuditEventCategory::Http:           return "Http";
+    case AuditEventCategory::Socket:         return "Socket";
+    case AuditEventCategory::ProcessCreate:  return "ProcessCreate";
+    case AuditEventCategory::ProcessReplace: return "ProcessReplace";
+    case AuditEventCategory::Threading:      return "Threading";
+    case AuditEventCategory::None:           break;
+    }
+    return "None";
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Path safety
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -215,26 +248,50 @@ bool is_inside_allowed_root(const boost::filesystem::path& candidate, const boos
 thread_local std::string PluginAuditManager::m_current_plugin_key = "";
 thread_local std::string PluginAuditManager::m_current_capability_name = "";
 thread_local std::vector<AllowedRoot> PluginAuditManager::m_scoped_allowed_roots;
+thread_local std::vector<PyObject*> PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames;
+thread_local int PluginAuditManager::m_releasing_frames = 0;
 thread_local bool PluginAuditManager::m_audit_denial_pending = false;
 thread_local bool PluginAuditManager::m_has_last_violation = false;
 thread_local AuditViolation PluginAuditManager::m_last_violation;
 
 ScopedPluginAuditContext::ScopedPluginAuditContext(const std::string& plugin_key,
                                                    const std::string& capability_name)
-    : m_previous_id(PluginAuditManager::instance().current_plugin())
+    : m_plugin_key(plugin_key)
+    , m_capability(capability_name)
+    , m_previous_id(PluginAuditManager::instance().current_plugin())
     , m_previous_capability(PluginAuditManager::instance().current_capability())
     , m_previous_scoped_roots(PluginAuditManager::m_scoped_allowed_roots)
+    , m_previous_root_frames(std::move(PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames))
 {
     PluginAuditManager::instance().set_current_plugin(plugin_key);
     PluginAuditManager::instance().set_current_capability(capability_name);
     PluginAuditManager::m_scoped_allowed_roots.clear();
+    PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames.clear();
 }
 
 ScopedPluginAuditContext::~ScopedPluginAuditContext()
 {
-    PluginAuditManager::instance().set_current_plugin(m_previous_id);
-    PluginAuditManager::instance().set_current_capability(m_previous_capability);
+    PluginAuditManager& mgr = PluginAuditManager::instance();
+
+    // Let this scope's root frames go while it is still the current context, and as its own
+    // plugin: the trampoline's denial path clears the key before the scope ends, and a finalizer
+    // must never be judged as the outer plugin, or bypass the audit when there is none. A
+    // finalizer may record a new root frame, so repeat until none is held.
+    if (!PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames.empty()) {
+        assert(PyGILState_Check());
+        mgr.set_current_plugin(m_plugin_key);
+        mgr.set_current_capability(m_capability);
+        while (!PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames.empty()) {
+            std::vector<PyObject*> frames = std::move(PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames);
+            PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames.clear();
+            mgr.release_frames(frames);
+        }
+    }
+
+    mgr.set_current_plugin(m_previous_id);
+    mgr.set_current_capability(m_previous_capability);
     PluginAuditManager::m_scoped_allowed_roots = std::move(m_previous_scoped_roots);
+    PluginAuditManager::m_root_frames          = std::move(m_previous_root_frames);
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -575,34 +632,6 @@ bool PluginAuditManager::last_violation(AuditViolation& violation) const
     return true;
 }
 
-bool PluginAuditManager::has_approved_ancestor(const std::string&              plugin_key,
-                                               const std::vector<std::string>& call_site_ids) const
-{
-    if (plugin_key.empty() || call_site_ids.empty())
-        return false;
-
-    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(m_mutex);
-    auto it = m_approved_call_sites.find(plugin_key);
-    if (it == m_approved_call_sites.end())
-        return false;
-
-    for (const auto& id : call_site_ids)
-        if (it->second.count(id))
-            return true;
-    return false;
-}
-
-void PluginAuditManager::record_approved_call_sites(const std::string&              plugin_key,
-                                                     const std::vector<std::string>& call_site_ids)
-{
-    if (plugin_key.empty() || call_site_ids.empty())
-        return;
-
-    std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(m_mutex);
-    auto& approved = m_approved_call_sites[plugin_key];
-    approved.insert(call_site_ids.begin(), call_site_ids.end());
-}
-
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // The C-level audit hook
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -663,40 +692,88 @@ std::string python_str(PyObject* object)
     return result;
 }
 
-std::vector<std::string> call_site_identities(const std::string& plugin_root)
-{
-    std::vector<std::string> ids;
-    if (plugin_root.empty())
-        return ids;
+// The interpreter's stdlib folders, and the site-packages folders inside them that hold
+// third-party code, both resolved. Set by install_hook(); like the verdict cache below, only
+// touched while the GIL is held.
+static std::vector<boost::filesystem::path>   s_stdlib_dirs;
+static std::vector<boost::filesystem::path>   s_site_package_dirs;
+static std::unordered_map<std::string, bool>  s_stdlib_file_verdicts; // co_filename -> is stdlib
 
+void collect_stdlib_dirs()
+{
+    s_stdlib_dirs.clear();
+    s_site_package_dirs.clear();
+    s_stdlib_file_verdicts.clear();
+
+    PyObject* sysconfig = PyImport_ImportModule("sysconfig");
+    PyObject* paths     = sysconfig ? PyObject_CallMethod(sysconfig, "get_paths", nullptr) : nullptr;
+    if (paths && PyDict_Check(paths)) {
+        const auto collect = [paths](const char* key, std::vector<boost::filesystem::path>& out) {
+            const std::string dir = python_unicode(PyDict_GetItemString(paths, key)); // borrowed
+            if (dir.empty())
+                return;
+            boost::system::error_code ec;
+            const boost::filesystem::path resolved = boost::filesystem::weakly_canonical(dir, ec);
+            out.push_back(ec ? boost::filesystem::path(dir) : resolved);
+        };
+        collect("stdlib", s_stdlib_dirs);
+        collect("platstdlib", s_stdlib_dirs);
+        collect("purelib", s_site_package_dirs);
+        collect("platlib", s_site_package_dirs);
+    }
+    Py_XDECREF(paths);
+    Py_XDECREF(sysconfig);
+    if (PyErr_Occurred()) {
+        PyErr_Clear();
+        BOOST_LOG_TRIVIAL(error) << "[AUDIT] Failed to read the stdlib folders from sysconfig";
+    }
+}
+
+bool is_stdlib_frame(PyObject* frame)
+{
+    PyCodeObject* code = PyFrame_GetCode(reinterpret_cast<PyFrameObject*>(frame)); // new reference
+    const std::string filename = python_unicode(code->co_filename);
+    Py_DECREF(code);
+    return PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file(filename);
+}
+
+// The frames on this thread's Python stack, innermost first. The pointers stay valid while the
+// caller runs, because a running activation keeps its frame object alive.
+std::vector<PyObject*> stack_frames()
+{
+    std::vector<PyObject*> frames;
     PyFrameObject* frame = PyEval_GetFrame(); // borrowed reference
     Py_XINCREF(frame);                        // normalize to an owned reference for the loop below
-
     while (frame) {
-        PyCodeObject* code     = PyFrame_GetCode(frame); // new reference
-        const std::string filename = python_unicode(reinterpret_cast<PyObject*>(code->co_filename));
-        const bool is_plugin_frame = !filename.empty() && boost::algorithm::starts_with(filename, plugin_root);
-
-        std::string id;
-        if (!is_plugin_frame && !filename.empty()) {
-            const std::string funcname = python_unicode(reinterpret_cast<PyObject*>(code->co_name));
-            id = filename + ":" + funcname + ":" + std::to_string(code->co_firstlineno);
-        }
-        Py_DECREF(code);
-
+        frames.push_back(reinterpret_cast<PyObject*>(frame));
         PyFrameObject* back = PyFrame_GetBack(frame); // new reference, or nullptr at the top of the stack
         Py_DECREF(frame);
         frame = back;
-
-        if (is_plugin_frame)
-            break;
-        if (!id.empty())
-            ids.push_back(std::move(id));
     }
+    return frames;
+}
 
-    Py_XDECREF(frame); // only holds a reference here if the loop exited via break
+// Moves the held root frames whose operation has returned from `held` to `dropped`. A suspended
+// generator's frame (os.walk between two items) is off the stack, but its operation resumes, so
+// it stays held until the scope ends.
+void take_returned_frames(std::vector<PyObject*>& held, std::vector<PyObject*>& dropped)
+{
+    if (held.empty())
+        return;
 
-    return ids;
+    const std::vector<PyObject*> stack = stack_frames();
+    const auto running = [&stack](PyObject* frame) {
+        if (std::find(stack.begin(), stack.end(), frame) != stack.end())
+            return true;
+        // NULL once the generator has finished or been deleted: its frame then owns its own data.
+        PyObject* generator = PyFrame_GetGenerator(reinterpret_cast<PyFrameObject*>(frame)); // new reference
+        const bool suspended = generator != nullptr;
+        Py_XDECREF(generator);
+        return suspended;
+    };
+    const auto returned = std::stable_partition(held.begin(), held.end(), running);
+    dropped.insert(dropped.end(), returned, held.end());
+    held.erase(returned, held.end());
 }
 
 static const std::unordered_set<std::string> two_path_fs_events{
@@ -717,12 +794,15 @@ static const std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<Py_ssize_t>> audit_targ
     {"socket.getnameinfo", {0}},
     {"socket.getservbyname", {0}},
     {"socket.getservbyport", {0}},
+    {"socket.sendto", {1}},
+    {"socket.sendmsg", {1}},
 
     {"os.system", {0}},
     {"subprocess.Popen", {1, 0}},
     {"os.posix_spawn", {1, 0}},
     {"os.spawn", {2, 1}},
     {"os.startfile", {0}},
+    {"os.startfile/2", {0}},
     {"pty.spawn", {0}},
     {"_winapi.CreateProcess", {1, 0}},
     {"_posixsubprocess.fork_exec", {0}},
@@ -767,7 +847,11 @@ std::vector<std::string> audit_targets(const std::string& event_name, AuditEvent
     const auto it = audit_target_arg_indices.find(event_name);
     if (it != audit_target_arg_indices.end()) {
         for (const Py_ssize_t index : it->second) {
-            std::string value = python_str(tuple_item(args, index));
+            // None is an argument left out (sendmsg without an address), not a target named "None".
+            PyObject* const item = tuple_item(args, index);
+            if (item == Py_None)
+                continue;
+            std::string value = python_str(item);
             if (!value.empty()) {
                 targets.push_back(std::move(value));
                 break;
@@ -778,8 +862,14 @@ std::vector<std::string> audit_targets(const std::string& event_name, AuditEvent
     return targets;
 }
 
-std::vector<std::string>* permission_list_for(AuditEventCategory category, PluginPermissions& permissions)
+// The saved list that grants an event: its category's target list, or the event-grant list for
+// an event with no target. Kept apart, so that no grant doubles as a target of the same name (an
+// os.fork grant is not an os.exec of a command named "os.fork").
+std::vector<std::string>* permission_list_for(AuditEventCategory category, bool by_event, PluginPermissions& permissions)
 {
+    if (by_event)
+        return &permissions.events;
+
     switch (category) {
     case AuditEventCategory::FsRead:        return &permissions.fs_read;
     case AuditEventCategory::FsReadWrite:   return &permissions.fs_readwrite;
@@ -792,6 +882,13 @@ std::vector<std::string>* permission_list_for(AuditEventCategory category, Plugi
     }
 }
 
+// An event with no target is granted by its effective category and name, e.g. "FsRead:open"
+// for a read of a file descriptor, which does not grant a write of one ("FsReadWrite:open").
+std::string event_grant_key(AuditEventCategory category, const std::string& event_name)
+{
+    return std::string(category_name(category)) + ":" + event_name;
+}
+
 bool has_permission(const std::vector<std::string>& granted, const std::string& target)
 {
     return std::find(granted.begin(), granted.end(), target) != granted.end();
@@ -902,22 +999,25 @@ bool prompt_for_targets(AuditEventCategory category, const std::string& plugin_n
 
 // Records a grant in the plugin's sidecar so it is not asked again. Reads the install state
 // freshly because the async prompt outlives the caller's stack copy of it.
-void persist_grant(const std::string& plugin_key, AuditEventCategory category, const std::vector<std::string>& targets)
+void persist_grant(const std::string& plugin_key, AuditEventCategory category, bool by_event, const std::vector<std::string>& keys)
 {
     PluginInstallState state;
     if (!PluginManager::instance().get_install_state(plugin_key, state))
         return;
 
-    std::vector<std::string>* permission_list = permission_list_for(category, state.permissions);
+    std::vector<std::string>* permission_list = permission_list_for(category, by_event, state.permissions);
     if (!permission_list)
         return;
 
-    for (const auto& target : targets)
-        persist_permission(plugin_key, state, *permission_list, target);
+    for (const auto& key : keys)
+        persist_permission(plugin_key, state, *permission_list, key);
 }
 
-// Requests permission for an audited event, returning true when it is already granted or the user
-// approves an inline prompt.
+static PluginAuditManager::PermissionPrompt s_permission_prompt_for_testing;
+
+// Asks the user to grant an audited event, returning true when they approve an inline prompt.
+// `keys` are what a Yes saves: the unresolved targets, or the event-grant key when the event has
+// no target (by_event), which the prompt does not show as a target.
 //
 // An audited event can fire on a thread the UI thread may itself be blocked waiting on: the
 // SlicingPipeline hook runs on the slicing worker thread (see PluginHooks.cpp), and
@@ -929,56 +1029,205 @@ void persist_grant(const std::string& plugin_key, AuditEventCategory category, c
 // prompt); the grant is persisted once the user accepts, so a later attempt succeeds without
 // re-prompting.
 bool request_permission(AuditEventCategory category, const std::string& plugin_key, const std::string& plugin_name,
-                        const std::string& event_name, const std::vector<std::string>& unresolved)
+                        const std::string& event_name, bool by_event, const std::vector<std::string>& keys)
 {
+    const std::vector<std::string> shown = by_event ? std::vector<std::string>{} : keys;
+
+    if (s_permission_prompt_for_testing)
+        return s_permission_prompt_for_testing(event_name, shown);
+
     if (wxTheApp == nullptr || GUI::wxGetApp().is_closing())
         return false;
 
     if (wxIsMainThread())
-        return prompt_for_targets(category, plugin_name, event_name, unresolved);
+        return prompt_for_targets(category, plugin_name, event_name, shown);
 
-    GUI::wxGetApp().CallAfter([category, plugin_key, plugin_name, event_name, unresolved]() {
+    GUI::wxGetApp().CallAfter([category, plugin_key, plugin_name, event_name, by_event, keys, shown]() {
         if (wxTheApp == nullptr || GUI::wxGetApp().is_closing())
             return;
-        if (prompt_for_targets(category, plugin_name, event_name, unresolved))
-            persist_grant(plugin_key, category, unresolved);
+        if (prompt_for_targets(category, plugin_name, event_name, shown))
+            persist_grant(plugin_key, category, by_event, keys);
     });
     return false;
 }
 
+// Decides an event that no allowed root or running operation covers: a saved grant allows it,
+// otherwise the user is asked and a Yes is saved.
 int decide_audited_event(PluginAuditManager&             mgr,
                          PluginInstallState&              state,
                          const std::string&                plugin_key,
                          const std::string&                plugin_name,
                          const std::string&                event_name,
                          AuditEventCategory                category,
-                         const std::vector<std::string>&   targets,
-                         std::vector<std::string>*         permission_list,
-                         const std::vector<std::string>&   call_site_ids)
+                         const std::vector<std::string>&   targets)
 {
-    std::vector<std::string> unresolved = targets;
+    const bool                     by_event = targets.empty();
+    const std::vector<std::string> keys     = by_event ? std::vector<std::string>{event_grant_key(category, event_name)} : targets;
+    std::vector<std::string>*      permission_list = permission_list_for(category, by_event, state.permissions);
+
+    std::vector<std::string> unresolved = keys;
     if (permission_list) {
         unresolved.clear();
-        for (const auto& target : targets)
-            if (!has_permission(*permission_list, target))
-                unresolved.push_back(target);
-        if (!targets.empty() && unresolved.empty())
+        for (const auto& key : keys)
+            if (!has_permission(*permission_list, key))
+                unresolved.push_back(key);
+        if (unresolved.empty())
             return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!request_permission(category, plugin_key, plugin_name, event_name, unresolved))
+    // Letting a root frame go runs finalizers inside a scope destructor or another event's hook,
+    // where no dialog may open: what they do must already be granted.
+    if (mgr.releasing_frames())
+        return report_denied(mgr, event_name, {false, "audit permission required"});
+
+    if (!request_permission(category, plugin_key, plugin_name, event_name, by_event, unresolved))
         return report_denied(mgr, event_name, {false, "audit permission required"});
 
     if (permission_list)
-        for (const auto& target : unresolved)
-            persist_permission(plugin_key, state, *permission_list, target);
-
-    mgr.record_approved_call_sites(plugin_key, call_site_ids);
+        for (const auto& key : unresolved)
+            persist_permission(plugin_key, state, *permission_list, key);
     return 0;
 }
 
+// Judges an audited event raised while a plugin context is active.
+int audit_plugin_event(PluginAuditManager& mgr, const std::string& event_name, AuditEventCategory event_type, PyObject* args)
+{
+    const bool                      fs_category = is_fs_category(event_type);
+    const std::vector<std::string>  targets      = audit_targets(event_name, event_type, args);
+
+    // A denied path (secrets, certificates, config files -- see is_denied_path) is an
+    // unconditional block: checked before the running-operation check below, so no granted
+    // operation can launder access to one, and before the allowed-root shortcut further down,
+    // so an allowed root (e.g. the read-only resources folder) cannot make a denied path
+    // underneath it reachable.
+    if (fs_category) {
+        for (const auto& target : targets) {
+            if (mgr.is_denied_path(boost::filesystem::path(target)))
+                return report_denied(mgr, event_name, {false, "denied path"}, target);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // A nested event of an operation already granted, e.g. socket.connect inside an approved
+    // urlopen(), is not asked again. urllib.Request is always judged on its own URL, so a
+    // redirect or a nested urlopen() inside a running request is not covered by it.
+    if (event_name != "urllib.Request" && mgr.covered_by_root_frame())
+        return 0;
+
+    // A filesystem target that resolves entirely inside a pre-determined allowed root -- the
+    // plugin system's own data_dir() tree (which holds each plugin's storage folder and the
+    // installed/system profile cache), the read-only bundled resources folder, or a per-call
+    // scoped root such as the current G-code folder -- is part of the plugin system's normal
+    // workflow and does not need a prompt.
+    if (fs_category && !targets.empty()) {
+        const bool is_write = event_type != AuditEventCategory::FsRead;
+        const bool all_inside_allowed_root =
+            std::all_of(targets.begin(), targets.end(), [&](const std::string& target) {
+                return mgr.check_path_access(boost::filesystem::path(target), is_write).allowed;
+            });
+        if (all_inside_allowed_root)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    PluginInstallState state;
+    const bool have_install_state = PluginManager::instance().get_install_state(mgr.current_plugin(), state);
+    if (!have_install_state) {
+        BOOST_LOG_TRIVIAL(warning) << __FUNCTION__ << " Failed to get install state for " << mgr.current_plugin();
+    }
+
+    const std::string plugin_name = state.plugin_name.empty() ? mgr.current_plugin() : state.plugin_name;
+
+    const int result = decide_audited_event(mgr, state, mgr.current_plugin(), plugin_name, event_name, event_type, targets);
+
+    // A granted operation covers its nested events while it runs. A targetless grant names no
+    // operation, so it covers nothing else.
+    if (result == 0 && !targets.empty() && operation_root_events.count(event_name))
+        mgr.record_root_frame();
+    return result;
+}
+
 } // namespace PluginAuditDetail
 
+void PluginAuditManager::record_root_frame()
+{
+    PyObject* frame = reinterpret_cast<PyObject*>(PyEval_GetFrame()); // borrowed reference
+    if (!frame || !PluginAuditDetail::is_stdlib_frame(frame))
+        return;
+    if (std::find(m_root_frames.begin(), m_root_frames.end(), frame) != m_root_frames.end())
+        return; // glob.glob and glob.glob/2 share a frame
+    Py_INCREF(frame);
+    m_root_frames.push_back(frame);
+}
+
+bool PluginAuditManager::covered_by_root_frame() const
+{
+    if (m_root_frames.empty())
+        return false;
+
+    // Only stdlib frames may sit between the event and the operation: plugin or library code
+    // the operation calls back into (an os.walk onerror, a urllib handler) acts on its own.
+    for (PyObject* frame : PluginAuditDetail::stack_frames()) {
+        if (std::find(m_root_frames.begin(), m_root_frames.end(), frame) != m_root_frames.end())
+            return true;
+        if (!PluginAuditDetail::is_stdlib_frame(frame))
+            return false;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+bool PluginAuditManager::releasing_frames() const { return m_releasing_frames > 0; }
+
+bool PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file(const std::string& filename)
+{
+    // Frozen stdlib modules (os, posixpath, codecs, ...) carry a pseudo filename.
+    if (boost::algorithm::starts_with(filename, "<frozen "))
+        return true;
+    if (filename.empty() || filename.front() == '<')
+        return false;
+
+    // Both sides are resolved: co_filename follows the Python home as it was given, which may
+    // be a symlink.
+    const auto [it, inserted] = PluginAuditDetail::s_stdlib_file_verdicts.try_emplace(filename, false);
+    if (inserted) {
+        const boost::filesystem::path file(filename);
+        const auto inside_any = [&file](const std::vector<boost::filesystem::path>& dirs) {
+            return std::any_of(dirs.begin(), dirs.end(),
+                               [&file](const boost::filesystem::path& dir) { return is_inside_allowed_root(file, dir); });
+        };
+        it->second = inside_any(PluginAuditDetail::s_stdlib_dirs) && !inside_any(PluginAuditDetail::s_site_package_dirs);
+    }
+    return it->second;
+}
+
+void PluginAuditManager::release_frames(std::vector<PyObject*>& frames)
+{
+    if (frames.empty())
+        return;
+
+    // A finalizer's own denial must neither replace the PermissionError of the event being
+    // decided nor leave a stale denial behind for the next call.
+    PyObject* const      error          = PyErr_GetRaisedException();
+    const bool           denial_pending = m_audit_denial_pending;
+    const bool           has_violation  = m_has_last_violation;
+    const AuditViolation violation      = m_last_violation;
+
+    std::vector<PyObject*> released;
+    released.swap(frames);
+    ++m_releasing_frames;
+    for (PyObject* frame : released)
+        Py_DECREF(frame);
+    --m_releasing_frames;
+
+    m_audit_denial_pending = denial_pending;
+    m_has_last_violation   = has_violation;
+    m_last_violation       = violation;
+    PyErr_SetRaisedException(error);
+}
+
+void PluginAuditManager::set_permission_prompt_for_testing(PermissionPrompt prompt)
+{
+    PluginAuditDetail::s_permission_prompt_for_testing = std::move(prompt);
+}
+
 int PluginAuditManager::audit_hook(const char* event, PyObject* args, void* user_data)
 {
     auto* mgr = static_cast<PluginAuditManager*>(user_data);
@@ -1006,62 +1255,20 @@ int PluginAuditManager::audit_hook(const char* event, PyObject* args, void* user
     if (event_type == AuditEventCategory::None)
         return 0;
 
-    const bool                      fs_category = is_fs_category(event_type);
-    const std::vector<std::string>  targets      = PluginAuditDetail::audit_targets(event_name, event_type, args);
-
-    // A denied path (secrets, certificates, config files -- see is_denied_path) is an
-    // unconditional block: checked before the ancestor-cascade check below, so a cascade
-    // approval recorded for an unrelated action can never launder access to one, and before
-    // the allowed-root shortcut further down, so an allowed root (e.g. the read-only resources
-    // folder) cannot make a denied path underneath it reachable.
-    if (fs_category) {
-        for (const auto& target : targets) {
-            if (mgr->is_denied_path(boost::filesystem::path(target)))
-                return PluginAuditDetail::report_denied(*mgr, event_name, {false, "denied path"}, target);
-        }
-    }
-
-    PluginDescriptor plugin_descriptor;
-    PluginManager::instance().try_get_plugin_descriptor(mgr->current_plugin(), plugin_descriptor);
-
-    // Some plugins call other audited events, e.g. urlib.request will call socket.connect. So this is so that if urlib.request
-    // was already approved, socket.connect won't trigger another permission dialog.
-    const std::vector<std::string> call_site_ids =
-        PluginAuditDetail::call_site_identities(plugin_descriptor.plugin_root);
-    if (mgr->has_approved_ancestor(mgr->current_plugin(), call_site_ids))
-        return 0;
-
-    // A filesystem target that resolves entirely inside a pre-determined allowed root -- the
-    // plugin system's own data_dir() tree (which holds each plugin's storage folder and the
-    // installed/system profile cache), the read-only bundled resources folder, or a per-call
-    // scoped root such as the current G-code folder -- is part of the plugin system's normal
-    // workflow and does not need a prompt.
-    if (fs_category && !targets.empty()) {
-        const bool is_write = event_type != AuditEventCategory::FsRead;
-        const bool all_inside_allowed_root =
-            std::all_of(targets.begin(), targets.end(), [&](const std::string& target) {
-                return mgr->check_path_access(boost::filesystem::path(target), is_write).allowed;
-            });
-        if (all_inside_allowed_root)
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    PluginInstallState state;
-    const bool have_install_state = PluginManager::instance().get_install_state(mgr->current_plugin(), state);
-    if (!have_install_state) {
-        BOOST_LOG_TRIVIAL(warning) << __FUNCTION__ << " Failed to get install state for " << mgr->current_plugin();
-    }
-
-    const std::string plugin_name = state.plugin_name.empty() ? mgr->current_plugin() : state.plugin_name;
-
-    std::vector<std::string>* permission_list = PluginAuditDetail::permission_list_for(event_type, state.permissions);
-
-    return PluginAuditDetail::decide_audited_event(*mgr, state, mgr->current_plugin(), plugin_name, event_name,
-                                                    event_type, targets, permission_list, call_site_ids);
+    // Root frames whose operation has returned are let go once this event is decided, so that a
+    // finalizer they run re-enters a hook whose held frames are already consistent.
+    std::vector<PyObject*> returned_frames;
+    PluginAuditDetail::take_returned_frames(m_root_frames, returned_frames);
+    const int result = PluginAuditDetail::audit_plugin_event(*mgr, event_name, event_type, args);
+    mgr->release_frames(returned_frames);
+    return result;
 }
 
 void PluginAuditManager::install_hook()
 {
+    // Tells the stdlib's own frames apart, for the operation-root frames (see record_root_frame).
+    PluginAuditDetail::collect_stdlib_dirs();
+
     // data_dir() is the primary globally-allowed root during plugin execution: read+write. It
     // covers the plugin system's own workflow needs -- each plugin's storage folder
     // (data_dir()/orca_plugins) and the installed/system profile cache (data_dir()/system) --

src/slic3r/plugin/PluginAuditManager.hpp

@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@
 // Via pybind11 so this file requests the same python3xx.lib as everything else.
 #include <boost/filesystem/path.hpp>
 #include <pybind11/conduit/wrap_include_python_h.h>
+#include <functional>
 #include <mutex>
 #include <string>
-#include <unordered_map>
-#include <unordered_set>
 #include <vector>
 
 #include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
@@ -144,15 +143,26 @@ public:
     void clear_last_violation();
     bool last_violation(AuditViolation& violation) const;
 
-    // --- call-site cascade cache ---
-    // A single plugin action often fires several nested CPython audit events as it passes
-    // through stdlib layers (urllib.request calling http.client calling socket, for example).
-    // Once the user approves one event, every stdlib frame still on the stack for that call
-    // is recorded here by (filename, function, first line) identity. A later event whose own
-    // ancestor chain still contains one of those frames is the same logical action seen from
-    // a deeper layer, so it is auto-approved instead of prompting again.
-    bool has_approved_ancestor(const std::string& plugin_key, const std::vector<std::string>& call_site_ids) const;
-    void record_approved_call_sites(const std::string& plugin_key, const std::vector<std::string>& call_site_ids);
+    // --- operation-root frames ---
+    // One stdlib operation fires several nested audit events as it passes through lower layers:
+    // urlopen() raises urllib.Request, then http.client and socket events. When an operation's
+    // own root event is granted (by a saved grant or the user), the stdlib frame that raised it
+    // is held, and a later event whose stack reaches that frame through stdlib frames only is
+    // part of the same operation, so it is allowed without a prompt of its own. Plugin or
+    // library code the operation calls back into is judged on its own. A frame is let go once it
+    // returns, a suspended generator's (os.walk) when the audit scope ends. Letting a frame go may
+    // run finalizers of objects its locals held; they are judged as the plugin and never prompt.
+    void record_root_frame();
+    bool covered_by_root_frame() const;
+    bool releasing_frames() const;
+
+    // True when code from `filename` (a code object's co_filename) is the interpreter's own
+    // stdlib: the only code a root frame's coverage passes through. Valid after install_hook().
+    static bool is_stdlib_file(const std::string& filename);
+
+    // Answers permission prompts in place of the dialog, for tests. Production never sets it.
+    using PermissionPrompt = std::function<bool(const std::string& event_name, const std::vector<std::string>& targets)>;
+    static void set_permission_prompt_for_testing(PermissionPrompt prompt);
 
     bool verbose_events = true;
 
@@ -163,24 +173,32 @@ private:
 
     static int audit_hook(const char* event, PyObject* args, void* user_data);
 
+    // Drops the references in `frames`, keeping the caller's error and denial state intact.
+    void release_frames(std::vector<PyObject*>& frames);
+
     static thread_local std::string                   m_current_plugin_key;
     static thread_local std::string                   m_current_capability_name;
     static thread_local std::vector<AllowedRoot>       m_scoped_allowed_roots;
+    static thread_local std::vector<PyObject*>         m_root_frames; // strong references
+    static thread_local int                            m_releasing_frames;
     static thread_local bool                           m_audit_denial_pending;
     static thread_local bool                           m_has_last_violation;
     static thread_local AuditViolation                 m_last_violation;
 
-    // mutable: is_denied_filename() and has_approved_ancestor() are const queries that must lock.
+    // mutable: is_denied_filename() is a const query that must lock.
     mutable std::mutex m_mutex;
     std::vector<AllowedRoot>             m_global_allowed_roots;
     std::vector<std::string>             m_denied_filenames;
     std::vector<std::string>             m_denied_path_keywords;
-    std::unordered_map<std::string, std::unordered_set<std::string>> m_approved_call_sites; // plugin_key -> call-site ids
 };
 
 // RAII guard that sets the current plugin key and capability name, restoring the previous
 // pair on scope exit. `capability_name` may be empty for calls that are not scoped to a
 // single capability.
+//
+// Each scope owns the root frames recorded inside it and lets them go, as its own plugin, before
+// restoring the outer context. That needs the GIL whenever a frame is still held, so construct
+// the scope after the GIL guard, to be destroyed before it.
 class ScopedPluginAuditContext
 {
 public:
@@ -194,9 +212,12 @@ public:
     ScopedPluginAuditContext& operator=(const ScopedPluginAuditContext&) = delete;
 
 private:
+    std::string                   m_plugin_key;
+    std::string                   m_capability;
     std::string                   m_previous_id;
     std::string                   m_previous_capability;
     std::vector<AllowedRoot>      m_previous_scoped_roots;
+    std::vector<PyObject*>        m_previous_root_frames;
 };
 
 } // namespace Slic3r

src/slic3r/plugin/PluginFsUtils.cpp

@@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ bool read_install_state(const boost::filesystem::path& plugin_dir, PluginInstall
             read_string_list("network_socket", parsed.permissions.network_socket);
             read_string_list("process", parsed.permissions.process);
             read_string_list("threading", parsed.permissions.threading);
+            read_string_list("events", parsed.permissions.events);
         }
 
         if (state.contains("enabled") && state["enabled"].is_boolean())
@@ -852,6 +853,7 @@ bool write_install_state(const boost::filesystem::path& plugin_dir, const Plugin
         {"network_socket", state.permissions.network_socket},
         {"process", state.permissions.process},
         {"threading", state.permissions.threading},
+        {"events", state.permissions.events},
     };
 
     nlohmann::json capabilities = nlohmann::json::array();

src/slic3r/plugin/PluginFsUtils.hpp

@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ struct PluginPermissions
     std::vector<std::string> network_socket;
     std::vector<std::string> process;
     std::vector<std::string> threading;
+    // Grants for audit events that expose no target, keyed "<category>:<event>" (e.g. "Socket:socket.__new__").
+    std::vector<std::string> events;
 };
 
 struct PluginInstallState {

src/slic3r/plugin/PyPluginTrampoline.hpp

@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ public:
     // mistake), both fall back to the base's empty object rather than writing `"cap_config": null`.
     nlohmann::json get_default_config() const override
     {
+        pybind11::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
         ORCA_PY_AUDIT_SCOPE();
         try {
-            pybind11::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
             pybind11::function override = pybind11::get_override(static_cast<const Base*>(this), "get_default_config");
             if (!override)
                 return Base::get_default_config();

src/slic3r/plugin/pluginTypes/printerAgent/PrinterAgentPluginCapabilityTrampoline.hpp

@@ -282,11 +282,11 @@ public:
     int request_bind_ticket(std::string* ticket) override
     {
         try {
-            ORCA_PY_AUDIT_SCOPE();
             ::Slic3r::PluginCapabilityInterface::RefCounter _orca_ref_counter(*this);
             ::Slic3r::PythonGILState gil;
             if (!gil)
                 throw std::runtime_error("Python interpreter is shutting down");
+            ORCA_PY_AUDIT_SCOPE();
             pybind11::function override =
                 pybind11::get_override(static_cast<const PrinterAgentPluginCapability*>(this), "request_bind_ticket");
             if (!override)

tests/slic3rutils/test_plugin_audit.cpp

@@ -1,22 +1,48 @@
 #include <boost/filesystem/path.hpp>
 #include <boost/filesystem/operations.hpp>
+#include <boost/system/error_code.hpp>
 #include <catch2/catch_all.hpp>
 
 #include <libslic3r/Utils.hpp>
 #include <libslic3r/libslic3r.h>         // GCODEVIEWER_APP_KEY, SLIC3R_APP_KEY (via libslic3r_version.h)
 #include <slic3r/plugin/PluginAuditManager.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/plugin/PluginFsUtils.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/plugin/PluginManager.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/plugin/PythonInterpreter.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/plugin/PythonPluginBridge.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/plugin/PythonPluginInterface.hpp>
+#include <slic3r/Utils/IPrinterAgent.hpp>
 #include <slic3r/Utils/OrcaCloudServiceAgent.hpp> // secret_constants::USER_SECRET_FILENAME
 
+#include <catch2/catch_message.hpp>
 #include <catch2/catch_test_macros.hpp>
+#include <catch2/matchers/catch_matchers.hpp>
+#include <catch2/matchers/catch_matchers_string.hpp>
 #include "libslic3r_version.h"
 #include "plugin_test_utils.hpp"
+#include "test_utils.hpp"
 
 #include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
+#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
+#include <pybind11/cast.h>
+#include <pybind11/embed.h>
+#include <pybind11/eval.h>
+#include <pybind11/gil.h>
+#include <pybind11/pybind11.h>
+#include <pybind11/pytypes.h>
+#include <pybind11/stl.h>
 
+#include <fstream>
+#include <functional>
+#include <ios>
+#include <memory>
 #include <string>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
 
 using namespace Slic3r;
 namespace fs = boost::filesystem;
+namespace py = pybind11;
 
 namespace {
 
@@ -349,3 +375,747 @@ TEST_CASE("Plugin audit a scoped root can also be registered read-only", "[audit
         CHECK_FALSE(mgr.check_open((readonly_dir / "vendor.json").string(), "w").allowed);
     }
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The audit hook, run in the embedded interpreter
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// Each TEST_CASE runs in its own process (catch_discover_tests), so each brings the plugin system
+// up with the audit hook installed, once, and shuts it down at the end. The tests loop over their
+// cases instead of using SECTIONs, which would restart the interpreter for every section.
+
+namespace {
+
+// Discovered, never loaded: the hook only needs the plugin's root and its sidecar.
+const char* const AUDIT_PLUGIN_SOURCE = R"PY(# /// script
+# requires-python = ">=3.12"
+#
+# [tool.orcaslicer.plugin]
+# name = "Audit Plugin"
+# description = "Plugin audit hook fixture"
+# author = "OrcaSlicer"
+# version = "1.0"
+# type = "script"
+# ///
+)PY";
+
+// A third-party library, installed outside the stdlib and outside the plugin.
+const char* const LIBRARY_SOURCE = R"PY(
+import socket
+import urllib.request
+
+def read_all(paths):
+    for path in paths:
+        with open(path) as f:
+            f.read()
+
+def connect_from_host(port):
+    socket.gethostname()
+    socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port)).close()
+
+def fetch(url):
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(url) as response:
+        return response.read()
+
+def fetch_each(urls):
+    for url in urls:
+        yield fetch(url)
+
+class ReadingHandler(urllib.request.BaseHandler):
+    """Reads a file while each response is processed."""
+    def __init__(self, path):
+        self.path = path
+        self.outcome = None
+
+    def http_response(self, request, response):
+        try:
+            open(self.path).close()
+            self.outcome = "ok"
+        except PermissionError:
+            self.outcome = "denied"
+        return response
+)PY";
+
+// Test-side Python, run outside any plugin context: files outside every allowed root, a local
+// HTTP server, the library, and every module the tests use imported up front, so that no import
+// happens inside a plugin context. Code from exec() runs as "<string>", which is not stdlib, so
+// attempt() and fetch() stand in for plugin code.
+const char* const AUDIT_SETUP = R"PY(
+import http.client, http.server, os, pathlib, shutil, socket, subprocess, sys, tempfile, threading
+import urllib.request, zipfile
+if os.name != "nt":
+    import pty
+
+APPROVED = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "approved.txt")
+PRIVATE = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "private.txt")
+MISSING = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "missing")
+TREE = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "tree")
+TRUE_COMMAND = ["cmd", "/c", "exit 0"] if os.name == "nt" else ["true"]
+for path in (APPROVED, PRIVATE):
+    with open(path, "w") as f:
+        f.write("x")
+for sub in ("one", "two"):
+    os.makedirs(os.path.join(TREE, sub))
+    with open(os.path.join(TREE, sub, "f.txt"), "w") as f:
+        f.write("x")
+
+LIBRARY = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "library")
+os.makedirs(LIBRARY)
+with open(os.path.join(LIBRARY, "netlib.py"), "w") as f:
+    f.write(LIBRARY_SOURCE)
+sys.path.insert(0, LIBRARY)
+import netlib
+
+class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def do_GET(self):
+        if self.path == "/redirect":
+            self.send_response(302)
+            self.send_header("Location", URL_B)
+            body = b""
+        else:
+            self.send_response(200)
+            body = b"ok"
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def log_message(self, *args):
+        pass
+
+server = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+PORT = server.server_address[1]
+BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % PORT
+URL_A, URL_B, URL_REDIRECT = BASE + "/a", BASE + "/b", BASE + "/redirect"
+urllib.request.install_opener(urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({})))
+
+def fetch(url):
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(url) as response:
+        return response.read()
+
+fetch(URL_A)  # urllib imports some modules on its first request
+
+def attempt(action):
+    try:
+        action()
+        return "ok"
+    except PermissionError:
+        return "denied"
+
+def spawn_checked(argv):
+    parent = os.getpid()
+    try:
+        return pty.spawn(argv)
+    finally:
+        if os.getpid() != parent:
+            os._exit(1)  # a child whose exec was refused must not go on running the tests
+
+finalizer_outcomes = []
+
+class TrackedRequest(urllib.request.Request):
+    def __del__(self):
+        finalizer_outcomes.append(attempt(lambda: open(PRIVATE).close()))
+)PY";
+
+struct Prompt
+{
+    std::string              plugin;
+    std::string              event;
+    std::vector<std::string> targets;
+};
+
+// One line per prompt, "event: target ...", so a failed check shows every prompt.
+std::string describe(const std::vector<Prompt>& prompts)
+{
+    std::string text;
+    for (const Prompt& prompt : prompts) {
+        text += prompt.event + ":";
+        for (const std::string& target : prompt.targets)
+            text += " " + target;
+        text += "\n";
+    }
+    return text;
+}
+
+// The plugin system with the audit hook installed, and the permission dialog replaced by a
+// recorder that answers with `approve`. Declare it first in a test, so it is destroyed last.
+struct AuditHarness
+{
+    // Before initialize(): the interpreter creates {data_dir}/python/packages and {data_dir}/log.
+    // data_dir() is a global allowed root from then on, so the test files live in `outside`.
+    ScopedDataDir                      data{"plugin-audit-hook"};
+    bool                               initialized = PluginManager::instance().initialize();
+    ScopedTemporaryDir                 outside{"orca-plugin-audit-outside"};
+    std::vector<Prompt>                prompts;
+    std::function<bool(const Prompt&)> approve = [](const Prompt&) { return false; };
+
+    AuditHarness()
+    {
+        PluginAuditManager::set_permission_prompt_for_testing(
+            [this](const std::string& event, const std::vector<std::string>& targets) {
+                prompts.push_back({PluginAuditManager::instance().current_plugin(), event, targets});
+                return approve(prompts.back());
+            });
+    }
+
+    ~AuditHarness()
+    {
+        PluginAuditManager::set_permission_prompt_for_testing(nullptr);
+        PluginManager::instance().shutdown();
+        PythonInterpreter::instance().shutdown();
+    }
+
+    // Call before taking the GIL: discovery is not Python work.
+    void add_plugin(const std::string& key)
+    {
+        const fs::path root = data.plugins_dir() / key;
+        fs::create_directories(root);
+        std::ofstream((root / (key + ".py")).string(), std::ios::binary) << AUDIT_PLUGIN_SOURCE;
+        save_permissions(key, {});
+        PluginManager::instance().discover_plugins(/*async=*/false, /*clear=*/true);
+    }
+
+    // Grants as if saved in an earlier session.
+    void save_permissions(const std::string& key, const PluginPermissions& permissions)
+    {
+        PluginInstallState state;
+        state.installed_from    = "local";
+        state.installed_version = "1.0";
+        state.plugin_name       = key;
+        state.permissions       = permissions;
+        REQUIRE(write_install_state(data.plugins_dir() / key, state));
+    }
+
+    PluginPermissions saved_permissions(const std::string& key) const
+    {
+        PluginInstallState state;
+        read_install_state(data.plugins_dir() / key, state);
+        return state.permissions;
+    }
+};
+
+// The test-side Python globals. Construct and destroy it with the GIL held; it stops the HTTP
+// server before the interpreter shuts down.
+struct PythonSide
+{
+    py::dict globals;
+
+    explicit PythonSide(const AuditHarness& harness)
+    {
+        globals["OUTSIDE"]        = harness.outside.path().string();
+        globals["LIBRARY_SOURCE"] = LIBRARY_SOURCE;
+        exec(AUDIT_SETUP);
+    }
+
+    // A Python error fails the test here, as text: an error_already_set left to propagate would
+    // outlive the interpreter the harness shuts down.
+    void exec(const char* code)
+    {
+        std::string error;
+        try {
+            py::exec(code, globals);
+        } catch (py::error_already_set& raised) {
+            error = raised.what();
+        }
+        if (!error.empty())
+            FAIL(error);
+    }
+
+    ~PythonSide()
+    {
+        try {
+            globals["server"].attr("shutdown")();
+            globals["server"].attr("server_close")();
+        } catch (...) {
+        }
+    }
+
+    std::string              str(const char* name) const { return py::str(globals[name]).cast<std::string>(); }
+    std::string              eval(const char* expression) const { return py::str(py::eval(expression, globals)).cast<std::string>(); }
+    std::vector<std::string> strings(const char* name) const { return globals[name].cast<std::vector<std::string>>(); }
+
+    // Runs `code` as `plugin_key`, as a trampoline call does: inside the caller's GIL, in an
+    // audit scope of its own.
+    void run_as(const std::string& plugin_key, const char* code)
+    {
+        ScopedPluginAuditContext audit(plugin_key);
+        exec(code);
+    }
+};
+
+PluginPermissions http_grants(std::vector<std::string> urls)
+{
+    PluginPermissions permissions;
+    permissions.network_http = std::move(urls);
+    return permissions;
+}
+
+const char* const PLUGIN = "AuditPlugin";
+
+} // namespace
+
+TEST_CASE("A saved request grant covers the request's own connection in a later session", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, http_grants({python.str("URL_A")}));
+
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, "outcome = attempt(lambda: fetch(URL_A))");
+
+    CHECK(python.str("outcome") == "ok");
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts).empty());
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("A saved request grant does not cover another URL or a redirect", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, http_grants({python.str("URL_A"), python.str("URL_REDIRECT")}));
+
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+outcomes = [attempt(lambda: fetch(url)) for url in (URL_A, URL_B, URL_REDIRECT)]
+outcomes += [attempt(lambda: netlib.fetch(url)) for url in (URL_A, URL_B)]
+outcomes.append(attempt(lambda: list(netlib.fetch_each([URL_A, URL_B]))))
+)PY");
+
+    // The redirect target is asked for inside the approved redirecting request, and a library's
+    // wrapper or generator asks for the second URL as plain code does.
+    CHECK(python.strings("outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"ok", "denied", "denied", "ok", "denied", "denied"});
+    const std::string url_b = "urllib.Request: " + python.str("URL_B") + "\n";
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == url_b + url_b + url_b + url_b);
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("Code an approved operation calls back into is judged on its own", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    python.exec(R"PY(
+CALLBACK_COPY = os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "callback-copy")
+handler = netlib.ReadingHandler(PRIVATE)
+handler_opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({}), handler)
+walk_outcomes = []
+copy_outcomes = []
+
+def on_walk_error(error):
+    walk_outcomes.append(attempt(lambda: open(PRIVATE).close()))
+
+def copy_file(source, destination):
+    copy_outcomes.append(attempt(lambda: open(PRIVATE).close()))
+)PY");
+    PluginPermissions permissions = http_grants({python.str("URL_A")});
+    permissions.fs_read           = {python.str("APPROVED"), python.str("MISSING")};
+    permissions.fs_readwrite      = {python.str("TREE"), python.str("CALLBACK_COPY")};
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, permissions);
+
+    // A library handler that urllib calls while the approved request runs, the plugin's own
+    // os.walk error callback and copytree copy function (called once per file), and a library
+    // loop over a saved file and an unsaved one.
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+request_outcome = attempt(lambda: handler_opener.open(URL_A).read())
+for _ in os.walk(MISSING, onerror=on_walk_error):
+    pass
+shutil.copytree(TREE, CALLBACK_COPY, copy_function=copy_file)
+loop_outcome = attempt(lambda: netlib.read_all([APPROVED, PRIVATE]))
+)PY");
+
+    CHECK(python.str("request_outcome") == "ok");
+    CHECK(python.eval("handler.outcome") == "denied");
+    CHECK(python.strings("walk_outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied"});
+    CHECK(python.strings("copy_outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied", "denied"});
+    CHECK(python.str("loop_outcome") == "denied");
+    const std::string private_file = "open: " + python.str("PRIVATE") + "\n";
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == private_file + private_file + private_file + private_file + private_file);
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("A saved directory walk covers each directory it lists", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    PluginPermissions permissions;
+    permissions.fs_read = {python.str("TREE"), python.str("APPROVED")};
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, permissions);
+
+    // The walk lists the tree's two subdirectories on later resumes, after the plugin's own
+    // audited reads in between. Abandoned walks leave frames whose generator is gone, which the
+    // next audited event lets go.
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+walked = []
+for root, dirs, files in os.walk(TREE):
+    walked.append(root)
+    open(APPROVED).close()
+globbed = list(pathlib.Path(TREE).glob("**/*"))
+
+abandoned = os.walk(TREE)
+next(abandoned)
+del abandoned
+open(APPROVED).close()
+for _ in pathlib.Path(TREE).glob("*"):
+    break
+open(APPROVED).close()
+)PY");
+
+    CHECK(py::len(python.globals["walked"]) == 3);
+    CHECK(py::len(python.globals["globbed"]) == 4);
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts).empty());
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("A freshly approved operation covers its nested events", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+
+    struct Case
+    {
+        const char* prompts;
+        const char* code;
+    };
+    // Each operation names targets no earlier one saved, so each is asked once. FsCreate and
+    // FsDelete grants are never saved, so those operations are asked every time. Only the
+    // expected prompts are approved, so a nested event left uncovered fails the operation.
+    std::vector<Case> cases = {
+        {"shutil.copytree", "shutil.copytree(TREE, os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'copy'))"},
+        {"shutil.copyfile", "shutil.copyfile(APPROVED, os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'copied.txt'))"},
+        {"shutil.move", "shutil.move(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'copied.txt'), os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'moved.txt'))"},
+        {"shutil.copystat", "shutil.copystat(os.path.join(TREE, 'one', 'f.txt'), PRIVATE)"},
+        {"shutil.make_archive", "shutil.make_archive(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'archive'), 'zip', root_dir=TREE)"},
+        {"shutil.unpack_archive", "shutil.unpack_archive(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'archive.zip'), os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'unpacked'))"},
+        {"pathlib.Path.glob", "list(pathlib.Path(TREE).glob('**/*'))"},
+        {"subprocess.Popen", "subprocess.run(TRUE_COMMAND, check=True)"},
+        {"tempfile.mkdtemp", "tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=OUTSIDE)"},
+        {"tempfile.mkstemp", "os.close(tempfile.mkstemp(dir=OUTSIDE)[0])"},
+        {"shutil.rmtree", "shutil.rmtree(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'copy'))"},
+        // send() runs after connect() has returned, so its own grant is asked once.
+        {"http.client.connect\nhttp.client.send",
+         "connection = http.client.HTTPConnection('127.0.0.1', PORT)\n"
+         "connection.request('GET', '/a')\n"
+         "connection.getresponse().read()\n"
+         "connection.close()"},
+    };
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    cases.push_back({"os.fwalk", "list(os.fwalk(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, 'unpacked')))"});
+    // The forked child's exec is covered by the spawn too: had it prompted, the child's own
+    // denial would end it with status 1.
+    cases.push_back({"pty.spawn", "spawn_status = spawn_checked(TRUE_COMMAND + ['spawned'])"});
+#endif
+
+    for (const Case& operation : cases) {
+        INFO(operation.code);
+        const std::string expected = std::string(operation.prompts) + "\n";
+        harness.approve = [&expected](const Prompt& prompt) {
+            return expected.find(prompt.event + "\n") != std::string::npos;
+        };
+        harness.prompts.clear();
+        python.run_as(PLUGIN, operation.code);
+
+        std::string asked;
+        for (const Prompt& prompt : harness.prompts)
+            asked += (asked.empty() ? "" : "\n") + prompt.event;
+        CHECK(asked == operation.prompts);
+    }
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    CHECK(python.eval("spawn_status") == "0");
+#endif
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("An event with no target is granted by name and remembered", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    harness.approve = [](const Prompt& prompt) { return prompt.event != "socket.sendto"; };
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+socket.socket().close()
+udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
+sendto_outcome = attempt(lambda: udp.sendto(b"x", ("127.0.0.1", 9)))
+udp.close()
+)PY");
+
+    // The socket is asked for once, without a target to show; the datagram's address is a target.
+    CHECK(python.str("sendto_outcome") == "denied");
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "socket.__new__:\nsocket.sendto: ('127.0.0.1', 9)\n");
+    CHECK(harness.saved_permissions(PLUGIN).events == std::vector<std::string>{"Socket:socket.__new__"});
+    CHECK(harness.saved_permissions(PLUGIN).network_socket.empty());
+
+    harness.prompts.clear();
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, "socket.socket().close()");
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts).empty());
+
+    // A grant for an event with no target covers nothing else: a library's approved
+    // gethostname() does not carry the connection it makes next.
+    harness.approve = [](const Prompt& prompt) { return prompt.event == "socket.gethostname"; };
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, "connect_outcome = attempt(lambda: netlib.connect_from_host(PORT))");
+    CHECK(python.str("connect_outcome") == "denied");
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "socket.gethostname:\nsocket.getaddrinfo: 127.0.0.1\n");
+    harness.prompts.clear();
+    harness.approve = [](const Prompt&) { return true; };
+
+#ifndef _WIN32
+    // sendmsg() without an address names no target either.
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+left, right = socket.socketpair()
+left.sendmsg([b"x"])
+left.close()
+right.close()
+)PY");
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "socket.sendmsg:\n");
+    CHECK(harness.saved_permissions(PLUGIN).events ==
+          std::vector<std::string>{"Socket:socket.__new__", "Socket:socket.gethostname", "Socket:socket.sendmsg"});
+#endif
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("An event grant does not stand in for another access or a target of the same name", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    harness.approve = [asked = 0](const Prompt&) mutable { return asked++ == 0; };
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    python.exec(R"PY(
+READ_FD = os.open(APPROVED, os.O_RDONLY)
+WRITE_FD = os.open(os.path.join(OUTSIDE, "scratch.txt"), os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT)
+)PY");
+
+    // A file descriptor has no path to show or save: a granted read of one is not a write.
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+fd_outcomes = [attempt(lambda: open(READ_FD, "r", closefd=False).close()),
+               attempt(lambda: open(WRITE_FD, "w", closefd=False).close())]
+)PY");
+    CHECK(python.strings("fd_outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"ok", "denied"});
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "open:\nopen:\n");
+    CHECK(harness.saved_permissions(PLUGIN).events == std::vector<std::string>{"FsRead:open"});
+
+    // A saved os.fork event grant is not an os.system command named "os.fork".
+    PluginPermissions permissions;
+    permissions.events = {"FsRead:open", "ProcessCreate:os.fork"};
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, permissions);
+    harness.prompts.clear();
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+reread_outcome = attempt(lambda: open(READ_FD, "r", closefd=False).close())
+system_outcome = attempt(lambda: os.system("os.fork"))
+os.close(READ_FD)
+os.close(WRITE_FD)
+)PY");
+    CHECK(python.str("reread_outcome") == "ok");
+    CHECK(python.str("system_outcome") == "denied");
+    REQUIRE(harness.prompts.size() == 1);
+    CHECK(harness.prompts.front().event == "os.system");
+    CHECK(harness.saved_permissions(PLUGIN).process.empty());
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("A finalizer run when a root frame is let go is judged as the plugin without a prompt", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin(PLUGIN);
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    PluginPermissions permissions = http_grants({python.str("URL_A")});
+    permissions.fs_read           = {python.str("APPROVED")};
+    harness.save_permissions(PLUGIN, permissions);
+    PluginAuditManager& mgr = PluginAuditManager::instance();
+
+    // Once the request returns, only its held frame keeps the request object alive, and the
+    // request's finalizer reads a file the plugin was never granted.
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, "fetch(TrackedRequest(URL_A))");
+    CHECK(python.strings("finalizer_outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied"}); // at scope end
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts).empty());
+    CHECK_FALSE(mgr.audit_denial_pending());
+
+    python.exec("finalizer_outcomes.clear()");
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+fetch(TrackedRequest(URL_A))
+open(APPROVED).close()  # the next event lets the returned request's frame go
+outcomes_before_scope_end = list(finalizer_outcomes)
+)PY");
+    CHECK(python.strings("outcomes_before_scope_end") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied"});
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts).empty());
+
+    // The finalizer's denial during another event's decision leaves that event's own denial intact.
+    python.exec("finalizer_outcomes.clear()");
+    python.run_as(PLUGIN, R"PY(
+fetch(TrackedRequest(URL_A))
+try:
+    os.listdir(OUTSIDE)
+    outer_error = ""
+except PermissionError as error:
+    outer_error = str(error)
+)PY");
+    CHECK(python.strings("finalizer_outcomes") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied"});
+    CHECK_THAT(python.str("outer_error"), Catch::Matchers::ContainsSubstring("os.listdir"));
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "os.listdir: " + python.str("OUTSIDE") + "\n");
+    AuditViolation violation;
+    REQUIRE(mgr.last_violation(violation));
+    CHECK(violation.event_name == "os.listdir");
+    CHECK(mgr.audit_denial_pending());
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("A nested audit scope does not see the outer scope's running operations", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.add_plugin("PluginA");
+    harness.add_plugin("PluginB");
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    PluginPermissions permissions;
+    permissions.fs_read = {python.str("TREE")};
+    harness.save_permissions("PluginA", permissions);
+
+    {
+        // Two walks plugin A started and suspended after listing the tree itself.
+        ScopedPluginAuditContext plugin_a("PluginA");
+        python.exec("first = os.walk(TREE)\nnext(first)\nsecond = os.walk(TREE)\nnext(second)");
+        {
+            // Plugin B resuming one of them is asked for each subdirectory, as plugin B.
+            ScopedPluginAuditContext plugin_b("PluginB");
+            python.exec("listed_by_b = len(list(first))");
+        }
+        // Back in plugin A's scope, its walks are covered again.
+        python.exec("listed_by_a = len(list(second))");
+    }
+
+    CHECK(python.globals["listed_by_b"].cast<int>() == 0);
+    CHECK(python.globals["listed_by_a"].cast<int>() == 2);
+    REQUIRE(harness.prompts.size() == 2);
+    for (const Prompt& prompt : harness.prompts) {
+        CHECK(prompt.plugin == "PluginB");
+        CHECK(prompt.event == "os.scandir");
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("Root frames held when a capability call ends are let go with the GIL, as the plugin", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    harness.approve = [](const Prompt& prompt) { return prompt.event == "os.walk"; };
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+    PythonSide python(harness);
+    (void) PythonPluginBridge::instance(); // force the embedded module registration into the binary
+    python.globals["orca"] = py::module_::import("orca");
+
+    // walk_and_drop() leaves a returned walk's frame held by the audit scope alone, with a marker
+    // in its locals; the frame is let go when the capability call ends, which runs the marker's
+    // finalizer.
+    python.exec(R"PY(
+class Marker:
+    def __init__(self, action=None):
+        self.action = action
+    def __del__(self):
+        finalized.append(self.action() if self.action else "ran")
+
+finalized = []
+
+def walk_and_drop(marker):
+    walker = os.walk(TREE, onerror=marker)
+    next(walker)
+    del walker
+
+class ConfigCapability(orca.PythonPluginBase):
+    def get_name(self):
+        return "config_cap"
+    def get_default_config(self):
+        walk_and_drop(Marker())
+        return {"finalized_during_call": len(finalized)}
+    def has_config_ui(self):
+        walker = os.walk(TREE, onerror=Marker(lambda: attempt(lambda: open(PRIVATE).close())))
+        next(walker)
+        attempt(lambda: os.listdir(OUTSIDE))  # denied: the trampoline clears the plugin key
+        del walker  # the walk's frame is now held by the audit scope alone
+        raise RuntimeError("the capability fails after a denial")
+
+class TicketAgent(orca.printer_agent.PrinterAgentBase):
+    def get_name(self):
+        return "ticket_agent"
+    def request_bind_ticket(self):
+        walk_and_drop(Marker())
+        return (0, "ticket")
+)PY");
+
+    py::object config_instance = python.globals["ConfigCapability"]();
+    auto       config_cap      = config_instance.cast<std::shared_ptr<PluginCapabilityInterface>>();
+    config_cap->set_audit_plugin_key("GilPlugin");
+    config_cap->set_resolved_identity("config_cap", PluginCapabilityType::Script);
+
+    py::object agent_instance = python.globals["TicketAgent"]();
+    auto       agent_cap      = agent_instance.cast<std::shared_ptr<PluginCapabilityInterface>>();
+    agent_cap->set_audit_plugin_key("GilPlugin");
+    agent_cap->set_resolved_identity("ticket_agent", PluginCapabilityType::PrinterConnection);
+    auto agent = std::dynamic_pointer_cast<IPrinterAgent>(agent_cap);
+    REQUIRE(agent);
+
+    // A host call arrives without the GIL; both calls take it before their audit scope.
+    nlohmann::json config;
+    int            ticket_result = -1;
+    std::string    ticket;
+    {
+        py::gil_scoped_release released;
+        config        = config_cap->get_default_config();
+        ticket_result = agent->request_bind_ticket(&ticket);
+    }
+    CHECK(config == nlohmann::json{{"finalized_during_call", 0}});
+    CHECK(ticket_result == 0);
+    CHECK(ticket == "ticket");
+    CHECK(python.strings("finalized") == std::vector<std::string>{"ran", "ran"});
+
+    // On the trampoline's denial path the frame is let go as the plugin, though the ambient key
+    // was cleared: the finalizer's read is audited and denied without a prompt.
+    python.exec("finalized.clear()");
+    harness.prompts.clear();
+    CHECK_THROWS_AS(config_cap->has_config_ui(), py::error_already_set);
+    CHECK(python.strings("finalized") == std::vector<std::string>{"denied"});
+    CHECK(describe(harness.prompts) == "os.walk: " + python.str("TREE") + "\nos.listdir: " + python.str("OUTSIDE") + "\n");
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("Stdlib code is recognized through a symlinked Python home", "[audit][Python]")
+{
+    AuditHarness harness;
+    if (!harness.initialized)
+        SKIP("Bundled Python interpreter unavailable: " + PythonInterpreter::instance().last_error());
+    py::gil_scoped_acquire gil;
+
+    const py::dict paths   = py::module_::import("sysconfig").attr("get_paths")();
+    const fs::path stdlib  = py::str(paths["stdlib"]).cast<std::string>();
+    const fs::path purelib = py::str(paths["purelib"]).cast<std::string>();
+    const fs::path link    = harness.outside.path() / "linked-stdlib";
+    boost::system::error_code ec;
+    fs::create_directory_symlink(stdlib, link, ec);
+    if (ec)
+        SKIP("Cannot create a directory symlink here: " + ec.message());
+
+    CHECK(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file((stdlib / "os.py").string()));
+    CHECK(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file((link / "urllib" / "request.py").string()));
+    CHECK(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file("<frozen os>"));
+    CHECK_FALSE(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file((purelib / "requests" / "api.py").string()));
+    CHECK_FALSE(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file((link / "site-packages" / "requests" / "api.py").string()));
+    CHECK_FALSE(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file((harness.outside.path() / "plugin.py").string()));
+    CHECK_FALSE(PluginAuditManager::is_stdlib_file("<string>"));
+}