From 203bc63f352853aba9801170dc228429a95e49b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: HanifKoh <76276251+HanifKoh@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:39:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Escape Project Metadata in the Project Page and Restrict
Accessory Opening (#15956)
* Escape Project Metadata in the Project Page and Restrict Accessory Opening
The Project page rendered the model and profile name, author, description
and accessory file names from the 3MF as live HTML. Names, authors and file
names are now set as text, and the file list is built from DOM nodes with
bound click handlers instead of concatenated markup. Descriptions can
legitimately carry rich-text HTML, so they are rebuilt from an inert
DOMParser document, keeping only plain formatting tags, http(s) links and
http(s) images, with every other attribute dropped.
Opening an accessory from the page now only launches regular files that
lie inside the project's extracted auxiliary directory. The containment
check is a new libslic3r helper, is_absolute_path_within_root, built on
is_path_within_root so symlinks leading out of the root are rejected too.
* Tighten Project Page Description Rendering and Keep More Formatting
Link and image URLs in descriptions must now start with an http or https
scheme as written and parse as such with the URL parser. Preview images are
built as DOM nodes like the file list, and accessory names show their full
text as a tooltip.
Descriptions keep more plain formatting: del, ins, figure, figcaption, dl,
dt, dd, caption, q, abbr, kbd and wbr, plus alt, title, width and height on
images, colspan and rowspan on table cells and start on ordered lists.
Numeric attributes must be plain integers. Embedded YouTube players become
a link to the video.
* Confirm Before Opening Program Attachments and Load Only HTTPS Images
Opening a project attachment whose type runs as a program or script
(executables, installers, shortcuts, shell and PowerShell scripts, macOS
command files and apps, Linux desktop entries) now asks for confirmation
first. The check lives in libslic3r as is_executable_file_name and ignores
the trailing dots and spaces Windows strips from file names.
Images in project descriptions are kept only when they load over https,
so opening the Project tab no longer issues plain-http requests.
* Open Project Attachments Through One Guarded Helper
The Edit Project Info view launched attachments directly, without the
checks the project page has. Both now call
desktop_open_project_attachment, which checks that the file is inside
the auxiliary directory, asks for confirmation where needed and then
opens it.
The auxiliary root was built through encode_path, which returns code
page bytes on Windows, while boost::filesystem reads a narrow string as
UTF-8. With a non-ASCII temporary directory the root never matched and
no attachment opened. It is now built from the UTF-8 path directly.
The list of program extensions could not be kept complete and let
unknown types open without a prompt. It is replaced by
is_safe_to_open_file_name, a list of plain document, image, model and
video types that open directly. Everything else asks first.
---
resources/web/model/model.js | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/libslic3r/Utils.hpp | 6 ++
src/libslic3r/utils.cpp | 23 +++++
src/slic3r/GUI/Auxiliary.cpp | 2 +-
src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.cpp | 24 +++++
src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.hpp | 3 +
src/slic3r/GUI/Project.cpp | 6 +-
tests/libslic3r/test_utils.cpp | 65 ++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/resources/web/model/model.js b/resources/web/model/model.js
index b401bea75b..3d7c2fc8ad 100644
--- a/resources/web/model/model.js
+++ b/resources/web/model/model.js
@@ -214,9 +214,9 @@ function ShowModelInfo( pModel )
SendWXDebugInfo("Model Name: "+sModelName);
- $('#ModelName').html(sModelName);
+ $('#ModelName').text(sModelName);
$('#ModelName').attr('title',sModelName);
- $('#ModelAuthorName').html(sModelAuthor);
+ $('#ModelAuthorName').text(sModelAuthor);
switch(UploadType)
{
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ function ShowModelInfo( pModel )
break;
}
- $('#Model_Desc').html( html_decode(sModelDesc) );
+ $('#Model_Desc').empty().append( SanitizeDescHtml( html_decode(sModelDesc) ) );
let ModelPreviewList=pModel.preview_img;
let TotalPreview=ModelPreviewList.length;
@@ -281,16 +281,15 @@ function ShowModelInfo( pModel )
if(TotalPreview>0)
{
- let htmlPreview='';
+ $('#ModelPreviewList').empty();
for(let pn=0;pn';
+ $('#ModelPreviewList').append( $('').append( $('![]()
').attr('src',FTmpPath) ) );
}
- $('#ModelPreviewList').html(htmlPreview);
$('#Model_Preview_Image').viewer({
title: false,
fullsreen: false,
@@ -410,7 +409,8 @@ function ConstructFileHtml( ID, pItem )
{
let fTotal=pItem.length;
- let strHtml='';
+ let pBoard=$('#'+ID+' .FileListBoard');
+ pBoard.empty();
for( let f=0;f').attr('src',ImgPath);
+ let pMenu=$('');
if( strClass!='ImageIcon' )
{
- strHtml+=''+
- '
'+
- '
'+
- ' '+
- '
'+
- '
'+
- '
'+
- ' '+
- '
![]()
').attr('src',FTmpPath) ) );
}
- $('#ProfilePreviewList').html(htmlPreview);
$('#Profile_Preview_Image').viewer({
title: false,
fullsreen: false,
diff --git a/src/libslic3r/Utils.hpp b/src/libslic3r/Utils.hpp
index eff7f51c2a..c85d33eed2 100644
--- a/src/libslic3r/Utils.hpp
+++ b/src/libslic3r/Utils.hpp
@@ -263,6 +263,12 @@ extern bool is_path_within_root(const std::string &rel_path, const boost::filesy
// True if a symlink stored at link_rel_path (relative to root) with this target stays inside root: the target
// must be relative, and joined to the link's directory it must pass is_path_within_root.
extern bool is_symlink_target_within_root(const std::string &link_rel_path, const std::string &target, const boost::filesystem::path &root);
+// True if path names an entry strictly inside root: it must be spelled with root as its prefix,
+// and must still resolve inside root once symlinks are followed.
+extern bool is_absolute_path_within_root(const boost::filesystem::path &path, const boost::filesystem::path &root);
+// True if a file with this name is of a type that the desktop opens as plain content, so it cannot run code.
+// Anything unknown is not safe.
+extern bool is_safe_to_open_file_name(const std::string &file_name);
// Orca: custom protocal support utils
inline bool is_orca_open(const std::string& url) { return boost::starts_with(url, "orcaslicer://open"); }
diff --git a/src/libslic3r/utils.cpp b/src/libslic3r/utils.cpp
index 303476f023..f56ce6a7af 100644
--- a/src/libslic3r/utils.cpp
+++ b/src/libslic3r/utils.cpp
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
#include
#include
+#include
#include
#include
#include
@@ -1127,6 +1128,28 @@ bool is_symlink_target_within_root(const std::string &link_rel_path, const std::
return is_path_within_root((sep == std::string::npos ? std::string() : link_rel_path.substr(0, sep + 1)) + target, root);
}
+bool is_absolute_path_within_root(const boost::filesystem::path &path, const boost::filesystem::path &root)
+{
+ const boost::filesystem::path rel = path.lexically_relative(root);
+ return !rel.empty() && rel != "." && is_path_within_root(rel.string(), root);
+}
+
+bool is_safe_to_open_file_name(const std::string &file_name)
+{
+ // Formats that cannot carry macros or scripts. Legacy and OpenDocument office files, HTML and SVG are left out on purpose.
+ static const std::vector safe_extensions = {
+ "jpg", "jpeg", "jfif", "pjpeg", "pjp", "png", "gif", "bmp", "webp", "tif", "tiff",
+ "pdf", "txt", "md", "csv", "docx", "xlsx", "pptx",
+ "stl", "obj", "3mf", "amf", "ply", "step", "stp", "iges", "igs", "dxf",
+ "mp4", "mov", "webm"};
+ // The name must end in the extension itself: Windows drops trailing dots and spaces and reads ':' as a stream separator.
+ const size_t dot = file_name.find_last_of('.');
+ if (dot == std::string::npos || file_name.find_first_of("/\\:") != std::string::npos)
+ return false;
+ const std::string extension = boost::algorithm::to_lower_copy(file_name.substr(dot + 1));
+ return std::find(safe_extensions.begin(), safe_extensions.end(), extension) != safe_extensions.end();
+}
+
bool is_img_file(const std::string &path)
{
return boost::iends_with(path, ".png") || boost::iends_with(path, ".svg");
diff --git a/src/slic3r/GUI/Auxiliary.cpp b/src/slic3r/GUI/Auxiliary.cpp
index 444daa4f91..67998b59d9 100644
--- a/src/slic3r/GUI/Auxiliary.cpp
+++ b/src/slic3r/GUI/Auxiliary.cpp
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ void AuFile::on_dclick(wxMouseEvent &evt)
if (m_type == AddFileButton)
return;
else
- wxLaunchDefaultApplication(m_file_path.wstring(), 0);
+ desktop_open_project_attachment(this, m_file_path);
}
void AuFile::on_mouse_left_up(wxMouseEvent &evt)
diff --git a/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.cpp b/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.cpp
index 5301b91d86..d7bd96f178 100644
--- a/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.cpp
+++ b/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.cpp
@@ -30,11 +30,13 @@
#include "AboutDialog.hpp"
#include "MsgDialog.hpp"
+#include "Plater.hpp"
#include "format.hpp"
#include "WebUserLoginDialog.hpp"
#include "libslic3r/Print.hpp"
+#include "libslic3r/Utils.hpp"
namespace Slic3r {
@@ -643,4 +645,26 @@ void desktop_open_any_folder( const std::string& path )
}
+bool desktop_open_project_attachment(wxWindow *parent, const boost::filesystem::path &path)
+{
+ // The auxiliary path is UTF-8, which is what boost::filesystem reads a narrow string as.
+ const boost::filesystem::path aux_root(wxGetApp().plater()->model().get_auxiliary_file_temp_path());
+ boost::system::error_code ec;
+ if (!is_absolute_path_within_root(path, aux_root) || !boost::filesystem::is_regular_file(path, ec))
+ return false;
+
+ // Attachments come with the project and carry no download mark, so the desktop would open them without a warning.
+ if (!is_safe_to_open_file_name(path.filename().string())) {
+ MessageDialog dlg(parent,
+ wxString::Format(_L("\"%s\" is not a plain document, image or model file. Opening it may run it as a "
+ "program or script on this computer.\n\n"
+ "Only open attachments from projects you trust. Open it anyway?"),
+ from_path(path.filename())),
+ _L("Open attachment"), wxICON_WARNING | wxYES_NO);
+ if (dlg.ShowModal() != wxID_YES)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return wxLaunchDefaultApplication(from_path(path), 0);
+}
+
} }
diff --git a/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.hpp b/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.hpp
index 0b3ac6d7b5..a5bbb35f6f 100644
--- a/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.hpp
+++ b/src/slic3r/GUI/GUI.hpp
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ extern void about();
extern void desktop_open_datadir_folder();
// Ask the destop to open one folder
extern void desktop_open_any_folder(const std::string& path);
+// Ask the desktop to open a file from the project's auxiliary directory, after a confirmation
+// unless its type is known to be plain content. Returns false if the file was not opened.
+extern bool desktop_open_project_attachment(wxWindow *parent, const boost::filesystem::path &path);
} // namespace GUI
} // namespace Slic3r
diff --git a/src/slic3r/GUI/Project.cpp b/src/slic3r/GUI/Project.cpp
index 7833cc7499..127400c8b1 100644
--- a/src/slic3r/GUI/Project.cpp
+++ b/src/slic3r/GUI/Project.cpp
@@ -293,10 +293,8 @@ void ProjectPanel::OnScriptMessage(wxWebViewEvent& evt)
if (!accessory_path.empty()) {
std::string decode_path = wxGetApp().url_decode(accessory_path.ToStdString());
fs::path path(decode_path);
-
- if (fs::exists(path)) {
- wxLaunchDefaultApplication(path.wstring(), 0);
- }
+ if (!desktop_open_project_attachment(this, path))
+ BOOST_LOG_TRIVIAL(warning) << "open_3mf_accessory: not opening " << decode_path;
}
}
else if (strCmd == "request_3mf_info") {
diff --git a/tests/libslic3r/test_utils.cpp b/tests/libslic3r/test_utils.cpp
index e2b220d482..6256e5f044 100644
--- a/tests/libslic3r/test_utils.cpp
+++ b/tests/libslic3r/test_utils.cpp
@@ -322,3 +322,68 @@ TEST_CASE("is_symlink_target_within_root rejects a target that passes through a
CHECK(is_symlink_target_within_root("link", "in/lib.so", root));
}
#endif
+
+TEST_CASE("is_absolute_path_within_root accepts only entries inside the root", "[utils]") {
+ namespace fs = boost::filesystem;
+ ScopedTemporaryDir outer;
+ const fs::path root = outer.path() / "Auxiliaries";
+ fs::create_directories(root / "Others");
+ const fs::path inside = root / "Others" / "note.txt";
+ const fs::path outside = outer.path() / "secret.txt";
+ std::ofstream(inside.string()) << "inside";
+ std::ofstream(outside.string()) << "outside";
+
+ SECTION("a file inside the root") {
+ REQUIRE(is_absolute_path_within_root(inside, root));
+ }
+ SECTION("a path inside the root whose file does not exist yet") {
+ REQUIRE(is_absolute_path_within_root(root / "Others" / "missing.txt", root));
+ }
+ SECTION("the root itself") {
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(root, root));
+ }
+ SECTION("a parent-directory escape spelled under the root") {
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(root / "Others" / ".." / ".." / "secret.txt", root));
+ }
+ SECTION("an absolute path elsewhere") {
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(outside, root));
+ }
+ SECTION("a sibling directory sharing the root's name as a prefix") {
+ const fs::path sibling = outer.path() / "Auxiliaries2" / "note.txt";
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(sibling, root));
+ }
+ SECTION("a relative path") {
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(fs::path("Others") / "note.txt", root));
+ }
+ SECTION("an empty path") {
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(fs::path(), root));
+ }
+#ifndef _WIN32
+ // Creating symlinks on Windows needs elevated rights or developer mode.
+ SECTION("a symlink inside the root that points outside") {
+ const fs::path link = root / "Others" / "link.txt";
+ fs::create_symlink(outside, link);
+ REQUIRE_FALSE(is_absolute_path_within_root(link, root));
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("is_safe_to_open_file_name accepts plain documents, images and models", "[utils]") {
+ const std::string safe = GENERATE(as{},
+ "Manual.pdf", "BOM.xlsx", "BOM.csv", "guide.docx", "notes.txt", "README.md", "photo.JPG", "render.png",
+ "assembly.step", "part.stl", "project.3mf", "drawing.dxf", "build.mp4", "setup.exe.pdf", ".pdf");
+ INFO(safe);
+ CHECK(is_safe_to_open_file_name(safe));
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("is_safe_to_open_file_name rejects programs and anything it does not know", "[utils]") {
+ const std::string unsafe = GENERATE(as{},
+ "setup.exe", "SETUP.EXE", "Manual.pdf.exe", "run.bat", "shortcut.lnk", "site.url", "script.ps1", "help.chm",
+ "tool.jar", "script.py", "Install.command", "install.sh", "launcher.desktop", "Printer.AppImage",
+ // Documents that can carry macros or scripts.
+ "BOM.xls", "BOM.xlsm", "guide.doc", "guide.docm", "sheet.ods", "page.html", "logo.svg", "bundle.zip",
+ // No extension, an unknown one, or a name the desktop would read differently.
+ "readme", "pdf", "data.xyz", "", "...", "Manual.pdf.", "Manual.pdf ", "setup.exe:note.txt", "dir.pdf/readme");
+ INFO(unsafe);
+ CHECK_FALSE(is_safe_to_open_file_name(unsafe));
+}
